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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
17078

-vsBERT LEON HANSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was initially charged with Second Degree
Murder, in violation of § 76-5-203, Utah Code Annotated (1953),
as amended.

Subsequently, an amended information was filed

charging appellant with Manslaughter by having recklessly
caused the death of another in violation of § 76-5-205, Utah
Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On March 5, 1980, counsel for the State was granted
his motion to file an amended information charging appellant
with the crime of manslaughter in violation of § 76-5-205,
Utah Code Annotated (1953) , as amended.

On the same day

before the Honorable David Sam, in the Fourth Judicial District
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Court, in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah, appellant
pled guilty to the charge of manslaughter.

On April 11, 1980,

appellant was sentenced by Judge Sam to the Utah State Prison
for a period of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years as provided by § 76-3-203 (2), Utah Code Annotated (1953)
as amended.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of Judge Sam's denial
of appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, rejection
of appellant's claimed due process violation, and affirmation
of the sentence imposed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 4, 1979 appellant brought his infant
daughter, Carnie Lee Hanson, to the Duchesne County Hospital
in Roosevelt, Utah for the treatment of multiple injuries.
Shortly after arriving at the hospital the infant died.

On

September 5, 1979 appellant was charged with the crime of
Murder in the Second Degree in violation of § 76-5-203 Utah
Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
On November 13, 1979, the date set for arraignment
in District Court, appellant was in the psychiatric unit of
St. Mark's Hospital for treatment.

Pursuant to a request by

defense counsel, Judge Sam, ordered the arraignment continued
to December 10, 1979

(R. 20).

-2-
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Prior to the December 10, 1979 arraignment,
appellant filed notice of his intent to rely on the defense
of insanity pursuant to§ 77-24-17, Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended (R. 21).

At the arraignment, appellant

entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity.

At that time the Court ordered appellant to be

examined by two psychiatrists who were to determine appellant's
sanity at the time of the offense.

Jury trial was set for

February 7, 1980 by Judge Sam (R. 22), but was subsequently
rescheduled for March 5, 1980 (R. 25).
During the period prior to the March 5, 1980 trial
date, the State and the defense entered into plea negotiations,
the result being the filing of an amended information on
March 5, 1980 charging appellant with manslaughter in violation
of § 76-5-205, Utah Code Annotated (R. 26).

To the amended

information appellant entered a plea of guilty.

Counsel for

the State indicated to the court that it would be in the
best interest of appellant that he not be incarcerated but
that he continue with treatment (R. 27).

The court advised

appellant of his rights regarding the entry of a guilty plea,
and informed appellant that the court would not be bound by
any recommendations (R. 27).

Lastly the court determined

that appellant made such plea voluntarily and with full
knowledge of his rights.

The court referred the matter to
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Adult Probation and Parole for a pre-sentence investigation
and report, and continued the case until April 11, 1980 for
sentencing (R. 27).
On April 11, 1980, following a meeting in chambers
with the trial judge and prior to sentencing, appellant moved
for a continuance of one week to allow time to file against
Judge Sam continuing in the case (R. 131).
denied.

This motion was

Appellant further moved to withdraw his guilty plea

which was also denied (R. 132).

Finding no legal reason

why judgment should not be pronounced, the trial court
sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for a period of
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years (R. 28, 133).
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF
GUILTY.
Appellant has correctly stated the law that under
the terms of § 77-24-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended,
and according to the great weight of authority, a motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and that a criminal defendant may not
withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right.

State v. Plum,

14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963); State v. Harris, 585 P 2d
450 (Utah 1978).

Appellant is contending, however, that the

trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

withdraw his guilty plea.

As relief, appellant asks this

Court to allow the withdrawal of his guilty plea, and to
remand the case for trial.

Respondent respectfully submits

that the trial court's refusal to allow appellant to withdraw
his plea of guilty was within the discretion granted that
court by law.

Respondent therefore asks this Court to affirm

the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea and to affirm the sentence imposed.
Appellant was originally charged with Second Degree
Murder under§ 76-5-203 Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended.

On the day scheduled for trial on the murder charge,

the State moved to amend the information and to charge appellant
with manslaughter.

Since appellant had no objection, the court

granted the motion and appellant pled guilty.
Before accepting appellant's guilty plea to the
charge of manslaughter, the trial court explained to appellant
his rights regarding entry of a guilty plea.

The trial court

also advised appellant that it was not bound by recommendations
of the doctors, County Attorney or the Adult Probation and
Parole Department (R. 27).

The trial court found appellant's

guilty plea to be free and voluntary made with full knowledge
of his rights and the possible consequences (R. 27).
This questioning by the court meets the requirements
of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(1969) that a guilty plea be knowingly and intelligently
given, and Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d
323 (1969), that a plea be made voluntarily, without undue
influence or coercion.

Respondent submits that the trial

court fulfilled its duty under the law in determining
that appellant's plea was voluntarily given.

Under the

rationale of Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1973)
and State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248

(Utah 1977), the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the
plea to be withdrawn.

In Stinson, the court held that where

the appellant had made a recent and clear statement before
the sentencing judge that he understood the charge and the
maximum punishment and the judge was advised of the plea
bargain, the refusal to permit the plea to be withdrawn was
not an abuse of discretion by the state trial court.

And

in Yeck, supra, this Court stated:
The right to a jury trial is constitutionally guaranteed but it may be waived, and when no issue is raised as to innocence,
there is nothing to try.
Once a !lea of
guilty is knowingly and voluntari y entered,
there are no issues for trial. Where, as
here, the plea of guilty is entered apparently
in a plea bargaining deal, there is no
compelling reason to permit it to be withdrawn by the accused.
It is a matter lying
entirely within the discretion of the trial
court and the denial of a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea will be reversed on appeal only
when an abuse of discretion is shown on the
part of the trial judge.
[Footnotes omitted.]
Id. at 1249.

(Emphasis added.)

-6-
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Appellant's argument that he was the victim of a
manifest injustice because the trial court did not follow
the recommendations of the examining psychiatrists, fails
to recognize that the trial court is not bound by any
recommendations.

Under § 76-3-404 Utah Code Annotated (1953),

as amended, "after receiving the report and recommendations,
the court shall proceed to sentence a defendant in accordance
with the sentencing alternatives provided under § 76-3-102."
A trial court is not bound by a plea bargain agreement, unless
the court in some way induced the plea.
York, 404 U.S.

Santobello v. New

257, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971) cited

by appellant is only applicable if the prosecution has failed
to carry out its bargained for obligation.

In Santobello,

Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority stated:
This phase of the process of criminal
justice and the adjudicative element
inherent in accepting a plea of guilty,
must be attended by safeguards to insure
the defendant what is reasonably due in
the circumstances. Those circumstances
will vary, but a constant factor is that
when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement by the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fulfilled.
404 U.S. at 262.
In the present case, appellant agreed to plead
guilty pursuant to a plea bargaining process, upon the advice
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of competent counsel, voluntarily and knowingly.

This was

not a case where the appellant was not given the promised
bargain by the prosecution.

The prosecution ·kept its part

of the bargain by amending the charge from second degree
murder to manslaughter, and by recommending to the trial
court that appellant not be incarcerated (R. 27) .

Appellant

was given no promise that he_ would not be sentenced to prison,
he could only be assured that the prosecutor would make the
recommendation.

The fact that appellant expected leniency

is not enough to render his guilty plea involuntary, nor does
the fact that a plea of guilty was entered because of the
possibility of obtaining a more lenient sentence make such a
plea an involuntary one.

In Miles v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 638

(8th Cir. 1976), the appellant contended that the state trial

court should be bound by a plea agreement or, in the alternative
that the court is required to indicate to the defendant its
rejection of the terms of the plea agreement and afford the
defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea before sentence
is pronounced.

In rejecting both alternatives the Miles

court stated:
[T)he evidence adduced at the hearing
indicates that appellant knew that the
court was not legally bound by the plea
agreement, and that appellant merely
believed that the court would probably
go along.
Such a subjective belief that
a lenient sentence will be imposed, even
if based on an erroneous estimate by
defense counsel, does not render a plea
involuntary.
[Citations omitted]
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Id. at 639.

(Emphasis added.)
-8-

Appellant attempts to distinguish the overwhelming
case law which acknowledges that a trial court has discretion
in accepting or rejecting the withdrawal of a plea, by asserting
that most cases involve a motion to withdraw after sentencing,
rather than before as in the present case.

However, several

Utah cases deal directly with an attempted withdrawal prior
to sentencing.
In State v. Larson, 560 P.2d 335 (Utah 1977) the
defendant attempted to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing,
claiming a later discovered basis of defense.

In rejecting

the appeal this Court stated:
We are convinced that the trial court
took all the necessary precautions to
insure that the guilty plea was voluntary and that the consequences of such
a plea were clearly understood by appellant.
To hold otherwise would allow a
defendant to change a plea at will up
until the time of sentencing.
Id. at 337.

(Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, in State v. Olafson, 567 P.2d

1~6

(Utah

1977) this Court rejected the appellant's argument that any
withdrawal prior to sentencing should be granted as a matter
of right.

The appellant in Olafson claimed that his plea was

not voluntary and that he had a good and meritorious defense.
This Court stated:
Defendant finally contends this Court
should adopt a ruling that a motion to
set aside a plea of guilty, filed prior
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to sentencing, should be granted as a
matter of right.
Section 77-24-3 U.C.A. (1953) provides:
. . . T.he court may at anytime before
judgment, upon a plea of guilty, permit
it to be withdrawn and a plea of not
guilty substituted.
This Court has consistently interpreted
thi~ statute as conferring "a discretionary power upon the trial court to allow
or disallow the change of a plea."
[Footnotes omitted]
Id. at 158.

(Emphasis added.)

From these cases it is apparent that regardless of
whether an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea is made before
or after sentencing, the decision to allow the motion rests
entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and absent
the showing of clear abuse, this decision will not be disturbed.
Appellant has shown no abuse, consequently the trial court's
decision should be affirmed.
Appellant was aware that the trial judge was not
planning to follow the plea bargain as a result of a conversation
in chambers with the trial judge prior to the sentencing
proceeding (R. 130).

Appellant should .not now be allowed to

withdraw his plea simply because he feels he made a "bad deal"
and didn't receive the sentence he believed he would get.
Miles, supra.
Finally although many other jurisdictions have
expanded the right of defendants to withdraw guilty pleas,
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Utah is not one of these jurisdictions.
on the issue of withdrawal of a plea.

Utah law is clear
To allow or refuse

to allow defendant's guilty plea to be withdrawn, is within
the sound discretion of the trial court and can only be
disturbed by a showing of clear abuse.

The fact that an

accused pleads guilty with the hope that he will not be
incarcerated is insufficient to allow the withdrawal of a
guilty plea where a sentence is imposed.

Whether a guilty

plea was coerced and involuntary is ordinarily a question
of fact, and district court findings are not to be disturbed
unless they are clearly erroneous or without support in the
record.

Gurulev. Turner, 461 F.2d 1083 (10th Cir. 1972).
Respondent respectfully submits that from the

above it is clear that the trial court acted properly in
accepting appellant's guilty plea.

The appellant here

entered a plea of guilty to the charge of manslaughter and
received the correct sentence for that crime.

Respondent

urges this Court to affirm the trial court's ruling and the
sentence imposed.
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POINT II
APPELLANT SUFFERED NO VIOLATION OF
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS SINCE THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT DOES NOT EXTEND TO A PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION.
on March 5, 1980, appellant entered a plea of
guilty to an amended charge of manslaughter under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953), as amended.

After finding

the plea to be voluntary and informing appellant of his
rights and the possible consequences of a guilty plea,
Judge David Sam referred the matter to the Adult Probation
and Parole Department for a pre-sentence investigation and
report.

Following a thorough investigation into the incident,

including appellant's background, marital history, health,
employment history, and collateral contacts, it was the
recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole that probation
be denied and that appellant be committed to the Utah State
Prison for the term prescribed by law.
It is appellant's contention that the sta-ffmeeting, "paneling," of Adult Probation and Parole, at
which the staff reviewed all the information regarding
appellant's case and made its written recommendation to
the court, constituted a "hearing" and as such appellant
had a constitutional right to be present and heard and
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.
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Since

appellant was not present at this staff meeting, he asserts
that his due process rights as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution were violated.
It is respondent's position that the formulation of a presentence report by Adult Probation and Parole is not a
hearing subject to Sixth Amendment protections.

Since

appellant had no constitutional right to be present at
the staff meeting, there was no violation of due process.
Appellant cites no cases in support of his
theory that he was constitutionally entitled to be present
when the Adult Probation and Parole staff made their report.
Case law on the subject rejects appellant's theory, as
evidenced by Commonwealth ex rel. Lockhart v. Myers,
165 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1960), cert. den. 368 U.S. 860, 7 L.Ed.2d
57, 82 S.Ct. 102, where the Court wrote:
Appellant complains that testimony was
then given by unsworn witnesses in his
absence.
It is of course true that a
defendant charged with a felony has a
right to be present at every stage of
the proceedings from arraignment to the
rendition of the verdict.
[Citations
omitted.]
However, this right does not
extend to a pre-sentence investigation.
Id. at 405

(emphasis added).
In Utah, a defendant may have the contents of a

pre-sentence report disclosed to him prior to sentencing.
In State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980), this Court
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held that the trial court committed reversible error in
sentencing defendant where a pre-sentence report prepared
by the Adult Probation and Parole Department had not
been disclosed to the defendant.

However, appellant in

the instant case is not asserting he was denied access
to the pre-sentence report, rather he contends he
should have been present when the report was made.

This

Court appears to have touched on this question in Lipsky:
However, it does not follow that
§ 77-35-13 encompasses the pre-sentence

report. On the contrary, we hold, for the
reasons discussed below, that the trial
court may receive information concerning
the defendant in the form of a pre-sentence
report without the author of the report
necessarily personally appearing and
testifying in open court, as would be
required by § 77-35-13, but that the
report should be disclosed to the defendant.
If the defendant thinks the report inaccurate,
he should then have the opportunity to bring
such inaccuracies to the court's attention.
Id. at 1244 (emphasis added).
The California Supreme Court in People v. Arbuckle,
587 P.2d 220 (Calif. 1978), similarly held that a defendant
had no right to cross-examine Department of Corrections'
employees who had prepared a sentencing report.

The Arbuckle

Court said:
The defendant could have challenged
factual statements contained in the report
by presenting his own evidence; but fundamental fairness does not require that he be
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allowed to challenge such statements by
cross-examining the personnel who prepared
the report, nor does it require that he be
permitted to challenge the professional
methods they employed.
Id. at 223

(emphasis added).
Applying the rationale of both Lipsky and

Arbuckle, if the author of a report need not testify or
be confronted in open court, neither should the meeting
at which the report is formulated be subject to confrontation
or cross-examination.

Accordingly the absence of appellant

from the meeting or appellant's inability to confront and
cross-examine cannot be a violation of appellant's due
process rights.
Appellant's due process rights were fully guaranteed
by the opportunity to examine his pre-sentence report and to
be heard on those items in the report which the trial court
would be considering in sentencing.

Appellant's failure to

take advantage of these opportunities should not be the
basis of this Court's extending due process rights to
including being present at a pre-sentence investigation
since this goes beyond the scope and intent of the Sixth
Amendment protections.
Since appellant's claim is neither supported by
constitutional interpretation nor statutory or case law,
respondent respectfully asks this Court to reject
appellant's claim.
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Moreover, appellant's claim would impose an
impossible administrative burden on the Adult Probation
and Parole Department.

Appellant's argument also

ignores the fact that a staff paneling is not an
adversary hearing or a hearing, but rather an executive
function not affected by the Sixth Amendment.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S SENTENCE IS WITHIN STATUTORY
LIMITS SET BY THE UTAH LEGISLATURE FOR
A SECOND DEGREE FELONY; THEREFORE, THE
SENTENCE IS NOT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT.
Appellant pled guilty to the charge of manslaughter,
a second degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953),
as amended, and was sentenced under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(11
(1953), as amended, for the indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years.

It is appellant's

contention that the sentence providing for incarceration at
the Utah State Prison constitutes cruel and unusual_ punishment
under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
It is the general rule that a sentence which imposes
punishment within the limits prescribed by a valid statute
cannot amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
United States, 273 F.2d 462

Smith v.

(10th Cir. 1959), cert. den.

363 U.S. 846, 4 L.Ed.2d 1729, 80 S.Ct. 1619 (1960).

See

also Matter of Jones, 578 P.2d 1150 (Mont. 1978); United
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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States v. MacClain, 501 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir. 1974).
Similarly, even if the penalty imposed is harsh, it
does not mean it constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.

People v. Lake, 580 P.2d 788

(Colo. 1978).

In State v. Ethington, 592 P.2d 768 (Ariz.
1979), the appellant asserted that the sentence
imposed was so excessive that it constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.

The Court held:

Appellant's sentence is within statutory
limits, and since the statute has not been
declared unconstitutional, his sentence
cannot be deemed cruel and unusual
punishment.
Id. at 770

(footnotes omitted).

In a special concurrence,

Justice Gordon wrote:
In order to challenge a penalty as
cruel and unusual, this Court, adhering
to the weight of authority on the subject,
has indicated that the statute imposing
the sentence, rather than the specific
sentence itself, must be shown to be
unconstitutional:
"[W]here the statute fixing punishment
for an offense is not unconstitutional,
a sentence within the limits prescribed
by such statute will not be regarded as
cruel and unusual." (Emphasis added.)
State v. Castano, 89 Ariz. 231, 233, 360
P.2d 479, 480 (1961).
Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
Appellant in this case does not challenge the
constitutionality of the statute imposing the sentence,
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but merely argues that the sentence as applied to him is
cruel and unusual.

In People v. Wingo, 534 P.2d 1001

(Calif. 1975), the California Supreme Court wrote:
Finally we pause to emphasize the
considerable burden a defendant must overcome in challenging a penalty as cruel or
unusual.
[Footnotes omitted.)
The doctrine
of separation of powers is firmly entrenched
in the law of California, and a court should
not lightly encroach on matters which are
uniquely in the domain of the Legislature.
Perhaps foremost among these are the
definition of crime and the determination
of punishment.
[Citations omitted.]
While
these intrinsically legislative functions
are circumscribed by the constitutional
limits of article 1, section 17, the validity
of enactments will not be questioned "unless
there unconstitutionality clearly, positively
and unmistakably appears." [Citations omitted.)
Id. at 1006.
The Utah State Legislature has determined that
conviction of the crime of manslaughter is punishable by
imprisonment of between one and fifteen years at the Utah
State Prison.

Appellant was sentenced within the limits

proscribed by the legislature.

Merely asserting that the

sentence is excessive as applied to him is not enough.
State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372, 438 P. 2d 542

In

(1968), appellant

in addition to challenging the constitutionality of the
statute, argued that the imposition of the maximum sentence
for a check of $13.32 was so excessive as to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.

This Court said:
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Generally if the statute fixing the
punishment be not unconstitutional, a
sentence within the limits prescribed
by such a statute will not be regarded
as cruel and unusual.
However, where
there is a wide spread between the
minimum and maximum punishment,
whether any particular sentence is
cruel or unusual is a matter to be
determined under all the facts and
circumstances.
[Footnotes omitted.]
We cannot impose our judgment on the
trial court. Our inquiry is limited to
the question of whether the sentence
imposed in proportion to the offense
committed is such as to shock the moral
sense of all reasonable men as to what
is right and proper under the circumstances.
[Footnotes omitted.]
Id. at 544. Appellant pled guilty to the crime of manslaughter,
the victim being a month old baby.

The trial judge acting

within his discretion and the statutory limits, sentenced
appellant to an indeterminate sentence of not less than one
year nor more than fifteen years.

In pronouncing the

sentence, the trial judge stated:
Before pronouncing judgment 1 wish
to state that the court has reviewed
the medical reports and the recommendations
that are contained therein and it is the
judgment of the court that because of the
nature of the offense and the manner in
which the offense was committed that
this offense should not go unpunished.
(R.132).

Taking all the facts and circumstances into

account, the trial judge sentenced appellant to the term
provided by law.

As such, the sentence is neither "shocking

to the conscious," Lloyd v. State, 576 P.2d 740 (Nev. 1978);
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nor an abuse of judicial discretion.
Appellant's sentence cannot be considered cruel
and unusual punishment for three reasons:

first,

the

sentence was within statutory limits; second, appellant
has failed to challenge the constitutionality of the statute:
third, there was no showing of any abuse of judicial discretion, nor was the sentence disproportionate to the crime.
For these reasons, respondent respectfully asks this Court
to affirm the sentence.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court validly accepted a
guilty plea and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
or in refusing to vacate the plea, respondent respectfully
asks the court to affirm the judgment and sentence.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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